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Abstract. In this paper we present efficient implementations of several
code-based identification schemes, namely the Stern scheme, the Véron
scheme and the Cayrel-Véron-El Yousfi scheme. For a security of 80 bits,
we obtain a signature in respectively 1.048 ms, 0.987 ms and 0.594 ms.
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1 Introduction
Code-based zero-knowledge identification and signature schemes are an interest-
ing alternative to classical (number theory based) digital signatures. Supposed
to resist quantum attacks, several code-based cryptosystems have been devel-
oped recently. Shor has showed a quantum algorithm which solves in polynomial
time the problems of discrete logarithm and factorization in [9], but no quan-
tum attack exists, so far, to solve the hard problems on which the code-based
cryptosystems are based.
In 1993, Stern proposed in [11] the first zero-knowledge identification scheme
based on the hardness of the binary syndrome decoding problem. A few years
later, Véron in [12] has designed a scheme with a lower communication cost.
Recently, Cayrel et al. in [3] have designed a scheme which reduce even more
this communication cost.
Using quasi-cyclic and quasi-dyadic constructions, several new constructions
like [1, 7] permits to reduce the size of the public matrices. We can use the same
kind of matrices in the context of zero-knowledge identification and signature
without lower the security of the resulting schemes.
Our contribution In this paper we provide, to our knowledge the first, efficient
implementations of the previous schemes for identification and signature. In [2],
the authors presented a smart implementation of the Stern scheme but it was
more a proof of concept than an efficient implementation.
Organization of the paper Section 2 describes the Stern, Véron and Cayrel-
Véron-ElYousfi schemes. Section 3 describes the results of our implementations.
Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 Code-based zero-knowledge identification schemes
In code-based cryptography, there have been many attempts to design identi-
fication schemes. In such constructions, there are two main goals: On the one
hand, a prover wants to convince a verifier of its identity. On the other hand, the
prover does not want to reveal any additional information that might be used
by an impersonator. In the following, we will give an overview of three proposals
in this area.
2.1 Stern scheme
The first code-based zero-knowledge identification scheme was presented at
Crypto’93 by Stern [11], its security is based on the syndrome decoding (SD)
problem. It uses a public parity-check matrix of the code over the binary field
F2. This scheme is a multiple-rounds identification protocol, where each round
is a three-pass interaction between the prover and the verifier. A cheater has a
probability of 2/3 per round to succeed in the protocol without the knowledge
of the secret key. The number of rounds depends on the security level needed;
for 80 bits security level, one needs about 150 rounds. For instance to achieve
the weak and strong authentication probabilities of 2−16 and 2−32 according the
norm ISO/IEC-9798-5, one needs respectively 28 and 56 rounds.
2.2 Véron scheme
In 1996, Véron proposed in [12] a dual version of Stern’s scheme. It uses a
generator matrix instead of a parity-check matrix of the code, which has the ad-
vantage to reduce slightly the communication costs. Véron’s scheme, as Stern’s,
is a multiple rounds zero-knowledge protocol, where each round is a three-pass
interaction between the prover and the verifier, for which the success probability
for a cheater is 2/3. Moreover, Véron suggested in [12] to use special techniques
over finite fields to reduce the computation and storage complexity of his scheme.
2.3 Cayrel-Véron-El Yousfi scheme
In 2010, Cayrel, Véron, and El Yousfi (CVE) presented in [3] a five-pass
identification protocol using q-ary codes instead of binary codes. In addition
to the new way to calculate the commitments, the idea of this protocol uses
another improvement which is inspired by [8, 10]. The main achievement of
this proposal is to decrease the cheating probability of each round from 2/3 for
Stern’s and Véron’s schemes to 1/2. This allows to decrease the communication
complexity and then to provide the desired security level in fewer rounds
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compared to Stern and Véron constructions. Furthermore, this scheme offers
a small public key size, about 4 kBytes, whereas that of Stern and Véron
scheme is almost 15 kBytes for the same level of security. It is proven in [3] that
this scheme verifies the zero-knowledge proof and its security is based on the
hardness of the syndrome decoding problem defined over Fq.
Since a large public matrix size is one of the drawbacks of code-based
cryptography, there have been many proposals which consists of replacing the
random codes by particular structured codes, namely quasi-cyclic proposed by
Gaborit and Girault in [5] or quasi-dyadic codes proposed by Miscozki and
Barreto in [7]. We can use the both variants in the three identifications schemes
presented above, in order to store the public matrix more efficiently.
We can also mention that the three presented identification schemes can
be turned into secure signature schemes by using the idea of Fiat-shamir
paradigm.
3 Efficient implementation
3.1 Description
In total, six different schemes have been implemented in C: the Stern, Véron
and CVE identification schemes and the corresponding signature schemes based
on the Fiat-Shamir transform [6]. The idea of the transform is to split the iden-
tification scheme in two parts. In the first part, the signer runs the identication
scheme as before, but only recording the responses without any checks. In the
second part, the verifier replays the saved responses and performs the necessary
checks. This also explains the relatively high signature size of schemes based on
the Fiat-Shamir transform. It also shows the varying sizes of the signatures, as
the given responses change from run to run with high probability.
All implementations use the SHA-3 finalist Keccak [4], both as hash function
and as random oracle. All tests have been carried out on an Intel(R) Core(TM)2
Duo CPU E8400@3.00GHz machine, the source code is publicly available.1.
3.2 Results
The following tables give the timings of some test runs. For the signature schemes
files of size about 1 MB, 10 MB and 25 MB have been used. As expected, the
actual responses (i.e. challenges) vary from run to run. The signatures sizes in
Table 2 are taken as approximate values across multiple runs.
As the code of the implementations does not use any object-oriented features,
a straightforward efficient Java implementation should be possible as well.
1 http://cayrel.net/spip.php?article189
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Stern Véron CVE
Rounds 28 28 16
n, r, w 768, 384, 76 768, 384, 76 144, 72, 55
Security level 280 280 280
Random 1.048 ms 0.987 ms 0.594 ms
n, r, w 1024, 512, 128 1024, 512, 128 256, 128, 97, 256
Security level 273 273 2143
Quasi-Cyclic 1.893 ms 1.634 ms 1.829 ms
Quasi-Dyadic 2.655 ms 2.522 ms 1.775 ms
Table 1. Timing results for Stern, Véron and Cayrel, Véron, and El Yousfi (CVE)
identification schemes.
Stern Véron CVE
Rounds 28 28 16
n, r, w 768, 384, 76 768, 384, 76 144, 72, 55
Security level 280 280 280
Message size [by.] Random (Sign/Verify [ms])
1.363.024 0.008/0.007 0.008/0.007 0.013/0.012
10.317.040 0.055/0.054 0.054/0.054 0.106/0.118
23.766.127 0.126/0.125 0.124/0.124 0.247/0.243
Signature size [by.] 60.000 60.000 15.000
n, r, w 1024, 512, 128 1024, 512, 128 256, 128, 97, 256
Security level 273 273 2143
Message size [by.] Quasi-Cyclic (Sign/Verify [ms])
1.363.024 0.008/0.007 0.008/0.007 0.014/0.013
10.317.040 0.056/0.053 0.055/0.054 0.108/0.105
23.766.127 0.129/0.126 0.125/0.125 0.247/0.243
Message size [by.] Quasi-Dyadic (Sign/Verify [ms])
1.363.024 0.009/0.008 0.009/0.008 0.014/0.013
10.317.040 0.056/0.054 0.056/0.055 0.104/0.108
23.766.127 0.127/0.125 0.126/0.126 0.247/0.243
Signature size [by.] 80.000 80.000 25.000
Table 2. Timing results for Stern, Véron and Cayrel, Véron, and El Yousfi (CVE)
signature schemes. The signature sizes are approximate values.
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4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have described three existing code-based identification and
signature and have provided a detailed comparison of their implementation. As
a result, we obtain three very fast signature (in less than 1ms) but very long
signature size from 25.000 for CVE to 80.000 bytes for Stern and Véron. The
security of the implementations faces side-channel attacks (like SAP and first
order DPA) has been studied in [2] but the security of those implementations
faces fault-injection or higher order DPA has not been studied yet. The source
codes are available here : http://cayrel.net/spip.php?article199.
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